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Abstract
Since the beginnings of the welfare state, Aotearoa New Zealand 
has lacked a principled, comprehensive and consistent system 
for indexing social assistance to movements in consumer prices 
and/or wages. This deficiency applies not only to cash transfers 
but also to in-kind benefits. The absence of a robust and durable 
indexation regime is no accident. It reflects, among other things, 
an unwillingness of governments to determine an acceptable 
minimum standard of living for citizens and then protect, if not 
enhance, this standard over time. No doubt, the fiscal implications 
of a more consistent approach to indexation have loomed large in 
the political calculus. Yet if the current and future governments are 
to meet ambitious child poverty reduction targets and ensure greater 
distributional fairness, a new framework for indexation is essential. 
This article discusses the nature and purpose of indexation, the 
principles and other considerations that should inform the design 
of an indexation regime, the policy options available, and how a 
durable and defensible policy framework might be secured.
Keywords: social assistance, indexation, adequacy, relative poverty, 
fairness, fiscal costs
Redesigning  
the Welfare State 
rethinking the indexation of cash 
and non-cash assistance 
Among the many issues that must be addressed in designing a welfare state, two are crucial: adequacy and 
indexation. Adequacy is about determining 
an acceptable minimum standard of living 
for citizens and then designing a package 
of social assistance with the aim of meeting 
this standard or benchmark. 
Indexation is about linking rates of 
social assistance to various indices of prices 
and/or incomes (e.g. average wages or 
median household incomes), ideally to 
ensure that any agreed standard of 
adequacy is maintained over time. Even in 
an environment of low inflation, without 
a comprehensive and effective indexation 
regime, the real value of any package of 
cash and non-cash assistance will fall, 
leaving some or all of those who are reliant 
on such assistance increasingly worse off. 
Similarly, in a context of rising average real 
wages, if there is no formal linkage between 
wages and social assistance, then the value 
of any package of social assistance will fall 
in relative terms. In short, a poorly designed 
indexation regime is almost certain to 
result in extended periods of time during 
which citizens who are partially or fully 
dependent on social assistance become 
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progressively worse off, both in real and 
relative terms. Unfortunately, this has been 
the pattern in New Zealand since the 
foundations of the welfare state more than 
a century ago.
Both adequacy and indexation are 
complex and controversial. They raise 
fundamental issues about the nature of 
social justice, what it means for citizens to 
live in dignity, and how adjustments in 
social assistance should be made over time 
to reflect evolving economic circumstances, 
such as improvements in productivity or 
changes in the overall level and/or structure 
of consumer prices. Equally, they pose 
questions about the role of economic 
incentives, ensuring prudent fiscal 
management in the face of inevitable 
economic shocks, and determining how 
much social assistance (and of what kind) 
is fiscally affordable and/or politically 
feasible. 
The focus of this article is on indexation 
rather than adequacy. While the two are 
closely connected, it is not possible to do 
justice to both in a brief contribution of 
this nature. Four main arguments are 
advanced in what follows. First, New 
Zealand lacks a principled and 
comprehensive system for the indexation 
of social assistance (in its many and varied 
forms). This constitutes one of the core 
weaknesses of our welfare state. On various 
grounds, not least fairness, reform is 
essential. Second, to achieve the primary 
goal of the Child Poverty Reduction Act – 
namely, a ‘significant and sustained 
reduction in child poverty’ – a more 
comprehensive and effective indexation 
regime will be essential. Third, designing a 
new indexation framework raises a 
multiplicity of issues. It will require 
rigorous analysis and an informed public 
debate. Fourth, to be durable over multiple 
governments, any new framework for 
indexing social assistance will need a 
measure of cross-party support and a 
mechanism to enable adjustments to 
accommodate major economic shocks. 
Creating an independent body to undertake 
authoritative reviews of the framework and 
recommend periodic changes is likely to 
enhance the credibility and durability of 
any new regime.
The current indexation regime
New Zealand’s welfare state is complicated, 
multifaceted and evolving (see, for 
instance, Berentson-Shaw and Morgan, 
2017; Cheyne, O’Brien and Belgrave, 2009; 
McClure, 1998; Rashbrooke, 2013; St John 
and So, 2018). It includes numerous forms 
of cash and non-cash assistance. Among 
these are dozens of separate welfare 
benefits (covering first-tier, second-tier and 
third-tier assistance), several types of tax 
credits for low- to middle-income families, 
various forms of housing assistance (both 
cash and in-kind), a range of subsidies for 
childcare and early childhood education, 
several forms of assistance for tertiary 
students, and numerous different subsidies 
for primary healthcare, dental care, 
education costs, transport costs and energy 
costs. Altogether, across the many domains 
of social policy there are literally hundreds 
of distinct policy instruments. Describing 
how and to what extent these varied 
instruments are indexed, let alone how 
such indexation has changed over time, 
would be a major undertaking. Such an 
exercise is not possible here. Nevertheless, 
one observation can be offered with 
high confidence: the current approach 
to indexation is ad hoc, inconsistent and 
unfair (Boston and Chapple, 2014; St John 
and So, 2018). Moreover, this has been the 
case since the early days of the welfare state. 
Take, for instance, the main form of 
family assistance during the mid-20th 
century, the universal family benefit: this 
was never indexed, whether to prices or 
incomes. Instead it was adjusted 
occasionally, typically by Labour 
governments. The lack of indexation meant 
that the family benefit gradually lost much 
of its value, all the more so during the rapid 
price inflation of the 1970s and 1980s. This 
helped seal its eventual demise in 1991. 
Had the family benefit retained its value 
(as originally set in the mid-1940s), or, 
indeed, had its real value been increased 
regularly in line with the rise in average 
living standards (as reflected in changes in 
real wages or household incomes), it would 
have been much harder to abolish, at least 
politically.
The unsatisfactory nature of the current 
approach to indexation is highlighted by 
the inconsistent treatment of different 
forms of social assistance (see Boston, 
Dalziel and St John, 1999) and the 
implications of this for the distribution of 
incomes (see Perry, 2018). Compare, for 
instance, New Zealand Superannuation 
(NZS) and first-tier welfare benefits (i.e. 
jobseeker support, sole parent support and 
the supported living payment) or family 
assistance, such as the family tax credit and 
the in-work tax credit. NZS is indexed to 
both consumer prices and average wages. 
Under the provisions of the New Zealand 
Superannuation and Retirement Income 
Act 2001, the rate of assistance (after tax) to 
those aged 65 years and older must be 
adjusted annually to reflect movements in 
both prices1 and wages (i.e. average ordinary 
time weekly earnings, for males and females 
combined, after tax). The Act requires that 
the rate of assistance for married couples 
or those in equivalent circumstances must 
not fall below 65%, or exceed 72.5%, of 
average ordinary time weekly earnings. 
These arrangements ensure that the 
incomes of elderly citizens are tied to the 
average earnings of those in paid 
employment. If average real wages increase 
from year to year, as has been the usual 
pattern for more than a century, then so do 
the real incomes of those receiving NZS. 
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The situation facing welfare 
beneficiaries and families with low market 
incomes is markedly different. First, welfare 
benefits and family assistance have never 
been indexed to wages. As a result, the 
value of welfare benefits and family 
assistance has typically fallen relative to 
average real wages over long periods of 
time – sometimes decades. Hence, many 
of those who are dependent on public 
assistance have become gradually worse off 
relative to the average living standards of 
those in paid employment. For instance, as 
highlighted in Figure 1, net benefit rates as 
a percentage of net average wage rates 
(including family assistance) have fallen 
almost continuously since 1986. During 
the same period, those on low market 
incomes with children have witnessed 
extended periods when the value of their 
child-related assistance has fallen in real 
terms. 
Second, many forms of social assistance 
are not fully linked to movements in the 
consumers price index (CPI). To be sure, 
in the case of most welfare benefits the 
basic rates of assistance are linked to the 
CPI (or, in recent times, the CPI excluding 
cigarettes and other tobacco products).2 
But the same linkage often does not apply 
to the income thresholds beyond which 
financial assistance is abated; nor does it 
apply to the value of assets (i.e. where asset 
tests apply). This means that over time 
some people will become ineligible for 
assistance, or the amount to which they are 
entitled declines. To compound matters, 
some important forms of social assistance 
are not indexed at all (e.g. the 
accommodation supplement), some have 
been only partially indexed for extended 
periods of time (e.g. the family tax credit), 
and some are only adjusted periodically 
when a particular trigger point is reached 
(e.g. price movements beyond a certain 
amount). Accordingly, other things being 
equal, those dependent on such assistance 
become worse off, not just in relative terms, 
but also in real terms (i.e. they experience 
a fall in their absolute standard of living 
over several or more years).
To illustrate, consider the following:
•	 The	 regime	 of	 tax	 credits	 for	 low-
income families is not fully indexed to 
prices. The largest single tax credit, the 
family tax credit, is currently indexed, 
but during 2011–18 the top rate was 
not indexed. The next largest tax credit, 
the in-work tax credit, is not indexed 
at all, although it was adjusted as part 
of the Child Hardship Package which 
took effect in April 2016.
•	 The	accommodation	supplement	has	
never been indexed since its 
introduction in the early 1990s, whether 
to the CPI or a specific index of housing 
costs. It was adjusted in 2005 (based on 
2003 data), but then the nominal rate 
of assistance remained unchanged until 
April 2018, notwithstanding large 
increases in house prices and rents 
during the intervening period. 
Inevitably, many of those dependent on 
the accommodation supplement to 
help pay their housing costs gradually 
became worse off.
•	 Many	income	thresholds	for	various	
forms of social assistance have 
remained unadjusted for decades. The 
amount of income that jobseeker 
support recipients can earn before their 
benefit payments are reduced was last 
increased in 1996, while the cash asset 
limits for accessing the accommodation 
supplement have remained unchanged 
since 1988 (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2017, p.19). The failure 
to adjust the parental income threshold 
for accessing student allowances 
resulted in 20% fewer students being 
eligible for such assistance between 
2011 and 2015. 
•	 Many	other	forms	of	social	assistance,	
including primary healthcare, disability 
assistance, early childhood education, 
tertiary education and legal aid, have 
never been fully or automatically 
indexed to prices – or the form of 
indexation has been altered on an ad 
hoc basis.
•	 Income	tax	thresholds	are	not	indexed	
to prices. Hence, as incomes rise, the 
average tax burden gradually increases. 
The failure to index social assistance 
on a consistent and principled basis has 
contributed to large (and increasing) 
income gaps between those in paid 
employment and those dependent on 
welfare benefits (see Raven, 2015; Perry, 
2018). This gap was exacerbated in the 
early 1990s when the real value of most 
welfare benefits was cut and then again in 
the mid-2000s with the introduction of 
the in-work tax credit. Many families with 
one or both parents in paid employment 
have also been negatively affected by the 
absence of a robust system of price and 
wage indexation for the assistance they 
receive for their children (i.e. via the 
Working for Families tax credits), housing 
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Figure 1: Net benefit rates as a percentage of net average wage rates, 
including family assistance, 1981–2017
DPB/SPS. 2 Children
UB/JSS, Couple, 1 Child
DPB/SPS, 1 Child
IB/SLP, single 18+
UB/ISS, single 25+
Source:  Fletcher, 2018 – also with acknowledgement to the work of Kay Goodger and David Rea in the Ministry of Social 
Development
Notes: 1. Family assistance includes the Family Tax Credit, Family Support, and the Family Benefit over the relevant years. It does not 
include the In-Work Tax Credit or any partial entitlement to the Family Tax Credit that a person/couple on the average wage 
might have.
 2. The average wage refers to the all industries, all persons, average ordinary time earnings on a full-time equivalent basis.
 3. DPB = Domestic Purposes Benefit; JSS = Jobseeker Support; SPS = Sole Parent Support; SLP = Supported Living 
Payment; UB = Unemployment Benefit.
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costs, and the costs of childcare and early 
childhood education.
Such problems are not, of course, 
unique to New Zealand (Adema, 2006; Barr, 
1998; Social Welfare Benchmarking and 
Indexation Group, 2001; Weaver, 1988). 
But our heavy reliance on means-tested 
assistance rather than social insurance 
exacerbates the impact. Where citizens are 
covered by social insurance (as in the case 
of accident compensation in New Zealand), 
they typically receive earnings-related 
compensation (albeit with a monetary cap) 
if they are unable to undertake paid 
employment. Because such compensation 
is earnings related, there is an automatic 
link in the system to market incomes. 
Typically, too, the level of compensation is 
more generous in social insurance schemes 
than in means-tested systems.
Explaining the current flawed indexation 
regime
Why have governments, including those 
of the centre-left, failed over at least three 
generations to develop a fairer and more 
consistent approach? Plainly, two factors 
are critical, one political, the other fiscal. 
In brief, indexation attracts remarkably 
little interest, whether academic, political 
or otherwise. There are very few academic 
papers on the topic and media coverage 
is limited (for a rare exception see Stock, 
2016). Partly for this reason, the impact 
of indexation (or a lack thereof) on both 
real and relative incomes is often poorly 
understood. Equally, there are few votes 
at stake. Most of those negatively affected 
by an inadequate indexation regime are 
poor. They tend to be politically inactive 
and/or lack the means to protect their 
long-term interests. Similarly, survey 
evidence suggests that public sympathy in 
New Zealand for those receiving welfare 
benefits is modest (at best), with only a 
minority supporting more generous levels 
of assistance (see Rashbrooke, 2016). 
Importantly, too, a lack of proper 
indexation constitutes a classic ‘creeping 
problem’.3 During times of low inflation, 
the fall in real and/or relative incomes 
experienced by those receiving social 
assistance is gradual. It thus attracts 
relatively little notice. To be sure, the 
cumulative effect over time may be large. 
But the process of gradual decline fails 
to generate specific ‘focusing events’ 
which spark the public’s attention and 
concern (see Kingdon, 2014). Experienced 
politicians understand such matters and 
know that they will probably not be held 
to account – or at least not for many 
years. Equally, they know that a properly 
indexed regime generates few, if any, 
opportunities for positive, vote-catching 
announcements. By contrast, the absence 
of a fully indexed system enables 
governments to make periodic upward 
adjustments to the value of particular 
forms of social assistance, thereby giving 
voters a sense that the government cares 
and is doing something to assist those 
who have become worse off.
The fiscal cost of indexation is the other 
critical factor explaining the current ad hoc 
and inconsistent policy regime in New 
Zealand. For instance, fully indexing each 
and every form of cash assistance to an 
appropriate price index would be costly – 
probably over $100 million annually. 
Extending the current indexation system 
for NZS to first-tier welfare benefits and 
other important forms of income support 
(e.g. the family tax credit) would increase 
the fiscal cost further. And assuming that 
average wages continue to increase 
gradually in real terms, then the additional 
fiscal cost will be cumulative, not simply a 
one-off increase. For instance, if average 
real wages increased by, say, 10% over the 
next five years, the additional annual fiscal 
cost of a similar increase in the main 
welfare benefits would be around $450 
million in 2024. (This would be on top of 
the extra cost arising from the current 
system of price indexation.) Moreover, if 
the main welfare benefits were linked to 
median household incomes, and if such 
incomes rose even faster than real wages, 
then the fiscal cost would be yet higher. 
While fiscal considerations are very 
important, they should not have overriding 
priority. The current indexation framework 
is unfair. It has a negative impact on many 
of New Zealand’s most deprived and 
vulnerable citizens. It needs reform.
Indexation and reducing child poverty
Currently, there is another factor of high 
relevance to any discussion of indexation 
in New Zealand. In December 2018, 
Parliament enacted the Child Poverty 
Reduction Act. Significantly, the legislation 
passed with cross-party support. The 
new Act requires governments to set 
child poverty reduction targets for four 
primary measures. One of these is a 
relative (or moving-line) poverty measure. 
The threshold in question is 50% of 
median disposable household incomes 
before adjusting for housing costs. As a 
relative measure, it is adjusted annually to 
reflect movements in median disposable 
household incomes; these, in turn, are 
affected by changes in wages. 
The current government has set a long-
term target for this primary poverty 
measure, namely a reduction of two thirds 
– from around 15% in recent years to 5% 
by 2028. This is consistent with a promise 
made during the 2017 election campaign 
by Sir William (Bill) English (the then 
prime minister and leader of the National 
Party). By any standards, this child poverty 
reduction target is ambitious. In order to 
achieve it, the incomes of the country’s 
poorest families will need to be raised 
relative to median disposable household 
incomes. Moreover, if such median 
incomes continue to rise, as is likely, it will 
also be necessary to ensure that the incomes 
of poor families increase at the same rate. 
Otherwise, the proportion of children 
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living in households with disposable 
incomes below the 50% threshold will rise. 
But here is a crucial point: in order 
achieve a significant and sustainable 
reduction in child poverty on this particular 
measure, it will not be enough simply to 
link social assistance to movements in the 
CPI (or a similar index); it will also be 
essential to link some of the most important 
forms of social assistance to movements in 
median or average wages, if not median 
disposable household incomes. This 
conclusion applies especially to those 
forms of income support which deliver the 
largest amount of cash assistance to our 
poorest families, namely first-tier welfare 
benefits and the family tax credit. Indeed, 
even if a government were to set a less 
ambitious long-term reduction target for 
the 50% poverty measure (before housing 
costs), the same basic logic would apply. If 
average wages (or median disposable 
household incomes) rise slightly faster than 
the CPI (as has generally been the case for 
many generations), then without linking 
major forms of income support – like first-
tier benefits and the family tax credit – to 
wages (or median disposable household 
incomes), those families at the bottom of 
the income distribution (especially those 
largely or wholly dependent on welfare 
benefits) will gradually fall behind those in 
the middle of the distribution. As a result, 
relative rates of income poverty will 
increase. In short, if governments are 
serious about reducing child poverty on all 
four primary measures, they will have no 
choice but to revise the current system of 
indexation, especially for core areas of 
income support.
Designing a new indexation framework – 
issues and options
It is unclear whether the Welfare Expert 
Advisory Group will tackle the problem 
of indexation in a comprehensive manner. 
But if it does not, a further independent 
review may well be required. Arguably, 
such a review should consider the full range 
of cash and non-cash social assistance 
currently provided by the government and 
then assess what type of indexation is most 
applicable in each case. 
Any such exercise should also consider 
overseas models. But it is not clear what 
lessons New Zealand might glean from 
experience elsewhere in the OECD, 
particularly in relation to wage indexation 
(see Adema, 2006). As noted earlier, most 
developed economies rely more heavily on 
social insurance than New Zealand. To the 
extent that such arrangements include 
earnings-related benefits, there are automatic 
linkages to wages. Aside from social insurance, 
the use of formal wage indexation is relatively 
uncommon. Equally, many other OECD 
countries, like New Zealand, have struggled 
to develop consistent and durable systems of 
price indexation.
If New Zealand’s current system for 
indexing social assistance were to be 
redesigned, numerous policy issues would 
require detailed attention. These include:
•	 Which	 forms	 of	 cash	 and	 non-cash	
assistance should be indexed?
•	 What	is	the	purpose	of	the	various	forms	
of social assistance? For instance, is it to 
cover part or all of the cost of a particular 
good or service, provide income 
replacement, or fulfil some other goal?
•	 Is	 the	 overall	 policy	 goal	 simply	 to	
maintain purchasing power over time or 
is it to ensure that social assistance is 
linked to changes in average living 
standards? If the latter, what is the 
appropriate measure of living standards 
and what are the appropriate benchmarks?
•	 What	particular	 form	(or	 forms)	of	
indexation should be applied to each 
of the different forms of assistance? For 
instance, which particular indices of 
prices, wages or household incomes 
should be used? If there is a formal link 
to wages, should this be to median or 
to average wages and should a gross or 
net measure be used?
•	 Should	all	or	only	some	aspects	of	a	
particular policy instrument be indexed 
(e.g. the rates of financial assistance, 
abatement thresholds, etc.)?
•	 Should	all	adjustments	be	mandatory	
(via appropriate legislation) and thus 
automatic in nature or should some be 
subject to annual budget decisions or 
other review processes?
•	 Should	all	adjustments	be	annual	or	
should some be subject to numerical 
triggers (e.g. an increase in the CPI or 
average wages beyond a specified 
amount)?
•	 Should	 provision	 be	 made	 for	
independent periodic reviews of the 
indexation regime and, if so, how 
should such reviews be conducted? 
Equally, what provision should be 
made for adjustments to the regime in 
response to major economic shocks?
Any serious analysis of such matters will 
need to consider a range of principles. 
These include: (1) practicality (e.g. is there 
an accurate and timely index available?); 
(2) simplicity; (3) fiscal affordability; (4) 
the role of indexation as an instrument for 
enhancing macroeconomic stability; (5) 
political acceptability; and (6) the wider 
policy implications (e.g. the indexation of 
income tax thresholds). 
Several matters need stressing. First, a 
principled and consistent approach to 
indexation does not imply that every form 
of social assistance should be treated in the 
same way. For instance, there is a good case 
for housing assistance – most notably the 
accommodation supplement – being 
adjusted on the basis of an index of housing 
costs rather than the CPI (let alone average 
wages). For instance, Statistics New Zealand 
has developed the household living-costs 
price indexes, which could be used for 
adjusting the accommodation supplement.
...if governments are serious about 
reducing child poverty on all four 
primary measures, they will have no 
choice but to revise the current system 
of indexation, especially for core areas of 
income support.
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Second, any systematic review of 
indexation would be challenging. There are 
many complex matters to address and many 
policy options. The accommodation 
supplement is a case in point. Currently, for 
the purposes of determining subsidy rates, 
various parts of the country have been 
assigned to four areas, each with a different 
maximum level of financial assistance. To 
the extent that housing costs change at 
different rates across the country, there may 
well be a case for a disaggregated system of 
indexation. But costs will also be rising at 
different rates within each of the four areas, 
which implies the need for a regular review 
of area designations as well as maximum 
rates. 
Third, any additional indexation to 
wages (or household incomes) is likely to 
be controversial, not least because of the 
extra fiscal cost. Realistically, therefore, 
such indexation may need to be limited to 
several core forms of social assistance 
where the justifications are strongest. As 
noted above, first-tier benefits and the 
family tax credit are obvious candidates. If 
such an approach were to be pursued, at 
least two issues would need to be addressed. 
What particular index should be used (e.g. 
average wages (as for NZS), median wages 
or median disposable household incomes)? 
Next, should there be a designated range 
within which the value of first-tier benefits 
and the family tax credit must remain (as 
for NZS) or should there be a fixed ratio? 
Other things being equal, linking to median 
wages would be fiscally cheaper than 
linking to average wages or median 
disposable household incomes, but this 
would raise the politically sensitive 
question of whether to alter the current 
indexation regime for NZS.
Fourth, any new comprehensive 
indexation regime should ideally be 
embodied in legislation, thus providing 
clarity and a reasonable measure of 
certainty. Having said this, policymakers 
may be reluctant to support a more 
comprehensive and mandatory system 
because of the long-term fiscal implications 
and the risk of greater policy rigidity. How 
might these concerns be addressed? Or, to 
put it differently, how might a durable 
policy framework be constructed? 
Securing a durable indexation framework
For durability at least two conditions must 
be satisfied: an adequate level of cross-party 
support and fiscal affordability over time. 
Both conditions are likely to necessitate an 
agreed process for responding effectively 
to significant economic shocks, together 
with a mechanism to enable periodic 
adjustments to the indexation regime – 
for instance, to reflect changing societal 
norms regarding adequacy. In other words, 
a well-designed ‘flexibility mechanism’ is 
needed. 
Securing even a modest level of cross-
party agreement for a more principled and 
consistent indexation regime will almost 
certainly be difficult. To be sure, a consensus 
on the indexation of NZS was reached in 
1993. But this reflected a distinctive and 
fraught political context: both major 
parties had made politically unsustainable 
policy decisions on retirement incomes 
during the preceding decade, and both 
were thus keen to depoliticise the topic and 
rebuild trust. In short, the two major 
parties shared a common political interest 
in securing a negotiated settlement on the 
level of, and annual adjustments to, 
retirement incomes. The same situation 
does not apply currently to the indexation 
of other forms of social assistance. To be 
sure, National’s support for the Child 
Poverty Reduction Act provides a possible 
political ‘hook’. But otherwise there are few 
cross-party drivers for a fairer and more 
consistent indexation regime, especially 
given the added fiscal cost.
With respect to the design of a 
‘flexibility mechanism’, one approach would 
be to establish, via legislation, an 
independent advisory committee on 
indexation. Such a committee would be 
comprised of people with relevant expertise 
and required to operate in accordance with 
clear statutory criteria. It would have two 
main responsibilities. The first would be to 
undertake periodic reviews (e.g. every five 
years) of the overall system of indexation, 
together with the indexation of each 
specific form of social assistance, and make 
recommendations to the government for 
reform. The second task would be to 
respond to governmental requests to 
undertake ad hoc reviews – for instance, 
following a major economic shock. Under 
such a policy framework, the government 
would be obliged to receive advice from the 
indexation committee before making any 
changes to the indexation regime. The 
government would retain the right to reject 
the committee’s recommendations but 
could be obliged (via the relevant 
legislation) to provide explicit reasons if it 
did so. 
There are various options regarding the 
form and composition of an indexation 
committee. One of these would be to 
establish a new stand-alone entity 
comprised of independent experts. But this 
would entail extra costs and may not be 
justified if the committee’s inquiries were 
infrequent. An alternative approach would 
be to mandate the proposed Independent 
Fiscal Institution (IFI) with the task of 
providing expert advice on indexation as 
one of its statutory responsibilities. This 
would entail the IFI employing staff with 
the requisite expertise to undertake such 
analyses, but this is highly likely given the 
IFI’s anticipated roles.
Conclusion
New Zealand’s lack of a principled, 
consistent and comprehensive regime 
for indexing social assistance constitutes 
a serious and enduring policy weakness. 
It has been among the major factors 
contributing to higher rates of relative 
poverty and income inequality over 
recent decades. The country’s poorest 
and most vulnerable citizens deserve 
New Zealand’s lack of a principled, 
consistent and comprehensive regime 
for indexing social assistance constitutes 
a serious and enduring policy weakness. 
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better. Accordingly, the current indexation 
framework requires urgent review. Whether 
the Welfare Expert Advisory Group 
addresses the matter adequately remains 
to be seen. If not, other opportunities to 
tackle the problem will need to be pursued.
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2. See the Social Security Act, S61HA(3). Note that some 
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convention, and others are adjusted on an ad hoc basis.
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